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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The following additional facts are relevant to points raised 
by the respondent/defendant Morris Air. 
Defendant has asserted that the phrase in the contract, that 
Morris "acts as principal," applies only to "public charter trips." 
The travel package, which Mr. Guevara purchased from Morris, was a 
"public charter trip." Defendant specifically admitted this fact 
in its reply memorandum below, wherein it stated, "for public char-
ter trips (such as this one) Morris Air 'acts as principal . . .f" 
(R. 116-17) (emphasis added). 
Defendant now admits that TurMexico did more than provide 
ground transportation. See Resp. Br. pp. 13-14. The evidence 
shows that TurMexico coordinated Mr. Guevara's activities on behalf 
of Morris, and that providing ground transportation was part of 
that role. The materials provided to Mr. Guevara in connection 
with his trip included, among other items, a letter from TurMexico 
dated December 1992 (R. 84) . Mr. Guevara took his trip in March of 
1993. That letter advises that his "fun value package" includes a 
fiesta, two tours and a cruise (R. 84). It also refers to a 
"welcome briefing" to be conducted by TurMexico (R. 84). A 
TurMexico letter provided Mr. Guevara with information about 
checking-out of his hotel (R. 85) . A TurMexico letter cautioned 
Mr. Guevara about time share promotions (R. 83). 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
The summary judgment in favor of defendant can be sustained 
only if one of two propositions is correct — 1) the contract 
between Morris and Mr* Guevara unequivocally precludes the 
liability in question, or 2) the undisputed facts establish, as a 
matter of law, that TurMexico was not an agent or associate of 
Morris. Although these issues are analytically distinct, this 
Court should not lose sight of the broader picture here. In a more 
general sense, this appeal should turn upon the answer to one very 
basic question. Considering the facts, circumstances and contract 
as a whole (as they must be considered), could a reasonable person 
in Mr. Guevara's position have understood TurMexico to be an agent 
or associate of Morris? Because this question must be answered in 
the affirmative, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
A. 
The Contract, As A Whole, Does Not Preclude 
Liability For The Negligence Of TurMexico 
Defendant argues, and the court below found, that the charter 
ticket unambiguously precludes vicarious liability for the negli-
gence of TurMexico and, alternatively, that plaintiff's evidence 
fails to support any contrary interpretation. Both conclusions are 
in error as a matter of law. 
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1. Defendant's Interpretation of the Contract Renders Meaningless 
the Term "Principal," 
The key provision — but not the exclusively relevant pro-
vision — is paragraph 13 of the charter ticket (R. 108) . On 
appeal, Morris states that the meaning of this provision is clear, 
but it fails to offer a coherent interpretation which harmonizes 
and gives meaning to each term. See Nielsen v. O-Reilly, 848 P.2d 
664, 665 (Utah 1992) . Rather than ascribing any meaning to its use 
of the term "principal," Morris directs its efforts to "explain" 
that term out of the contract. The law requires construing 
contract provisions as a whole, not finding excuses to justify 
ignoring part of it. See Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah App. 1994). 
Morris1 primary explanation is, that it "acts as principal" 
only for "public charter trips." Morris further contends, that its 
role as principal is limited to making arrangements with other 
providers which are independent contractors. The first point 
supports plaintiff's position, that Morris was TurMexico's princi-
pal, because this was a public charter trip. Thus, whatever role 
Morris has as a principal is applicable in this case. Morris1 
second point purports to set forth what is included in its role as 
principal (i.e., making arrangements with independent contractors). 
The flaw is that this explanation fails to ascribe any meaning or 
significance to the use of that term "principal." It still fails 
to identify who the agents are. If Morris "acts as principal," 
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even in some limited capacity, it must do something in that role as 
a principal and, there must be agents. Merely making arrangements 
is not the act of a principal. 
2 . Defendant has Failed to Show that the Contract is Unambiguous. 
One plausible interpretation of 5 13 is that the terms upon 
which Morris seeks to rely — the disclaimer and the reference to 
independent contractors — apply only ,![i]n all other cases" (R. 
108). That is, these terms do not apply to public charter trips, 
such as this one, where Morris "acts as principal." This view is 
certainly consistent with the structure of fl3. Most important, it 
is plausible and reasonable, which is the standard for determining 
whether or not an ambiguity exists. See Willard Pease Oil and Gas 
Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co. , 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) ("pro-
vision is ambiguous [if] it is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation"); Seare v. University of Utah School of 
Medicine, 882 P.2d 673, 677 (Utah App. 1994) (provision is 
ambiguous if it "may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings"); Sparrow v. Tayce Construction Co, , 846 P.2d 1323, 1327 
(Utah App. 1993). 
According to defendant, Sparrow, supra, is distinguishable 
because, there, the ambiguity related to price in a "contract for 
sale." See Resp. Br., p. 23.l Sparrow does not stand for the 
'Defendant also discusses Cox v. Cox, 877 P. 2d 1262 (Utah App. 
1994) as a case which plaintiff cites "as an example of an 
ambiguous contract." Resp. Br., p. 23. That is inaccurate. 
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proposition that a contract is unambiguous unless there is some 
sort of empirical, mathematical conflict. It holds that an 
ambiguity exists where, as here, there is an internal contradiction 
with regard to material terms. See 846 P. 2d at 1327. Neither 
Willard Pease Oil, 899 P.2d at 772-73 nor Seare, 882 P.2d at 677 
involved a numerical conflict, yet the courts in both cases held 
the contracts to be ambiguous. In the case at bar, Morris1 
relationship with the service providers and its potential liability 
for their acts were sufficiently important to be the subject of an 
entire paragraph. This is hardly a trivial or immaterial inconsis-
tency. Moreover, a clear contradiction exists when that paragraph 
states that Morris "acts as principal" (in some vaguely defined 
manner), then purportedly disclaims that the only other entities 
mentioned are not agents of Morris in any respect. 
Defendant's invocation of the rule, that merely stating a 
differing interpretation is insufficient, is rather ironic. Plain-
tiff agrees — the test is not whether or not one can state "some 
interpretation," but whether or not that interpretation is 
objectively reasonable. See Willard Pease Oil, 899 P. 2d at 772-73. 
Mr. Guevara's construction is at least as reasonable as Morris1 
interpretation, which fails to explain why it chose to use the term 
"principal." Thus, even if Mr. Guevara's and Morris1 respective 
Plaintiff cited Cox for the proposition that, where an agreement is 
set forth in more than one document, all documents must be 
considered in construing that agreement. See App. Br., p. 21. 
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interpretations are viewed in the same light, 5 13 is ambiguous in 
itself. 
3 - Defendant has Failed to Respond to Other Issues of Contract 
Interpretation. 
Plaintiff raised several points to which defendant has failed 
to respond. There are legal presumptions which operate against the 
drafter of the writing and against exculpatory clauses in general. 
See Jones, Waldo, et al. v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 
1996)(doubtful terms construed against drafter); Interwest Con-
struction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah 1996) (exculpatory 
clause must be unequivocal). Under these recent Supreme Court 
cases, one who drafts a provision intending to limit its liability 
must do so in terms which are objectively clear to the other party. 
Morris1 unilateral intent to exculpate itself is irrelevant, where 
the language it has chosen is confusing or unclear.2 
Defendant has also declined to dispute plaintiff's assertion 
that the contract was not integrated, and that all documents 
generated by Morris were part of the agreement. See Bailey-Allen, 
876 P.2d at 424; Hall v. Process Instruments and Controls, 890 P.2d 
1024, 1028 (Utah 1995); Cox, 877 P.2d at 1268-69. Thus, these 
other documents must be considered in determining whether or not an 
ambiguity exists, and not merely in resolving one. 
2Just as the subjective opinion of one party will not, by 
itself, defeat summary judgment, neither does the moving party's 
subjective belief in what a provision means provide a basis for 
granting it. 
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4. The Evidence Extrinsic to the Charter Ticket Is Sufficient to 
Create a Dispute of Material Fact. 
Once the contract is shown to be ambiguous, summary judgment 
is proper only if the extrinsic evidence offered by the parties 
undisputedly establishes that the moving partyfs interpretation is 
correct. Defendant asserts that the evidence offered by Mr. 
Guevara was insufficient. It does not explain how or why this 
evidence is insufficient, except to say that the court below was of 
that opinion. See Resp. Br., p. 25.3 That sounds very much like 
asking this Court to defer to the trial court's assessment of the 
facts and evidence, which would not be proper. First, a trial 
court cannot weigh conflicting evidence on a motion for summary 
judgment. See Winegar v. Froerer Co., 813 P. 2d 104, 107 (Utah 
1991). Second, and precisely because the trial court cannot engage 
in fact-finding, this Court does not defer to a lower court1s 
factual or legal conclusions on an appeal from summary judgment. 
See Schurtz v. BMW of N.A. , 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991). 
Thus, it is really no response at all to merely invoke the decision 
of the trial court. 
What both defendant and the court below seem to have missed 
here is that a court, on summary judgment, can no more interpret 
3Calling plaintiff's documentary evidence "brochures'1 is 
neither accurate nor persuasive. The itineraries, confirmations 
and letters received from Morris, which plaintiff offered as 
evidence, are not merely general advertising materials. Most of 
these were tailored to this trip. Defendant has completely failed 
to address the specifics of this evidence. 
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the meaning of an agreed-upon set of facts, than it can resolve a 
dispute as to such facts. See Sandberg v. Klein, 575 P.2d 1291, 
1292 (Utah 1978). It is not only the underlying facts, but also 
the inferences to be drawn therefrom, which must be undisputed and 
viewed in favor of the opposing party. Id. This is why summary 
judgment is rarely, if ever, proper once a contract is found to be 
ambiguous — because the ultimate issue is not what was said or 
done, but what may be inferred therefrom as to the intent of the 
parties. See Winecrar, 813 P.2d at 107; Willard Pease Oil, 899 P.2d 
at 770. Unless the non-moving party has made some conclusive 
admission or has offered no relevant objective evidence, this is 
inevitably a matter for the jury. 
Here, Morris offered no extrinsic evidence at all, much less 
an admission by Mr. Guevara that he understood and intended the 
contract to mean what Morris says it means. By contrast, Mr 
Guevara offered specific objective evidence (Morris1 own represen-
tations) , from which a jury could reasonably infer that one in 
Mr. Guevara's position could interpret the contract as he has 
interpreted it. Mr. Guevara has not, as defendant claims, simply 
expressed an opinion as to what the contract means and expected 
that to suffice. Thus, summary judgment was improper because, even 
if both parties agree as to what occurred, there is a dispute as to 
what each intended and as to whether or not there was a "meeting of 
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the minds" as to the meaning of the provision in question. See C 
& Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah App. 
1995). 
B. 
A Jury Could Infer From The Facts Presented 
That TurMexico Was An Apparent Or Actual Agent 
Defendant relies very heavily upon the "control test," as 
discussed in Foster v. Steed, 432 P. 2d 60, 62 (Utah 1967) and 
Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996). Such 
reliance is misplaced, and these cases are not controlling. The 
control test is completely irrelevant as to whether or not Morris 
held out TurMexico as an apparent agent. It is only marginally 
relevant to actual agency under the circumstances of this case. A 
factual dispute as to either (or both) types of agency precludes 
summary j udgment. 
1. Plaintiff's Evidence Shows that Morris Held out TurMexico as 
its Agent. 
It is axiomatic, that there are two types of agency -- actual 
and apparent. See Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd. , 855 P. 2d 204, 208-
9 (Utah 1993). Actual agency derives from the relationship between 
the alleged principal and agent. Luddington, 855 P. 2d at 208; King 
v. Riveland, 886 P.2d 160, 165 (Wash. 1994). In proper cases, the 
principal's right of control might be a critical factor. On the 
other hand, apparent agency derives from the relationship between 
the third party asserting such agency and the alleged principal. 
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See Luddington, 855 P.2d at 208-9; King, 886 P.2d at 165. The 
principal's right of control is irrelevant to apparent agency. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Guevara's primary theory is apparent 
agency. The elements of apparent agency are: that the principal 
has, by acts or representations, held out the alleged agent as 
having authority; that the third party believed that the agent had 
such authority; and, that the third party relied thereon to his 
detriment. See Luddington, 855 P. 2d at 209; see also King, 886 
P. 2d at 165 (third party must believe agent has authority, and such 
belief must be "objectively reasonable"). Here, Mr. Guevara's 
evidence consists, primarily, of representations by Morris indica-
ting that TurMexico was its agent or associate.4 Mr. Guevara has 
testified that he believed TurMexico to be an agent or associate of 
Morris, and that he relied upon that in purchasing his ticket. 
Mr. Guevara's belief was objectively reasonable, as discussed in 
Part A, above. His reliance proved detrimental when he was injured 
during the course of the trip. See Greil v. Travelodge Interna-
tional, Inc. , 541 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 (111. App. 1989) (principal may 
be vicariously liable for negligence of apparent agent). These 
facts are sufficient to create a jury question on the issue of 
apparent agency, as to which Morris' control of TurMexico has no 
bearing. Id. 
4These include statements by TurMexico, which Morris ratified 
by transmitting them to plaintiff. In addition to its representa-
tions, Morris also "knowingly permitted [TurMexico] to assume the 
exercise" of responsibilities and authority indicating agency. 
Luddington, 855 P.2d at 209. 
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Like the meaning of an ambiguous contract, the issue of appar-
ent agency is not particularly amenable to disposition on summary 
judgment. Again, even where the underlying facts are undisputed, 
the ultimate fact issue is Mr, Guevara's reliance and its objective 
reasonableness — which must be inferred from those facts. Once 
again, defendant confuses the issue of "what is sufficient" with 
"what is relevant." Although Mr. Guevara's belief and reliance are 
not sufficient to establish apparent agency, they are relevant. 
Unless Mr. Guevara's understanding, that TurMexico was an agent, 
and his reliance thereon were unreasonable, as a matter of law, 
summary judgment was improper. See Sandberg, 575 P. 2d at 1292. 
Clearly, that is not the case, and the judgment must be reversed. 
2. There Exists a Factual Dispute as to Actual Agency. 
Defendant incorrectly argues that actual agency cannot be 
proved without evidence of control. As Glover makes clear, the 
control test is not "the" test in every case of actual agency. 923 
P. 2d at 1386. It is, fundamentally, a test of whether there exists 
a master/servant relationship, which was applied to a franchiser/ 
franchisee situation in Foster. Indeed, the test has its origin in 
workers' compensation law. See Glover, 923 P. 2d at 1386. Right of 
control is not a prerequisite to agency in every case, but only in 
those cases where the alleged agency is of a master/servant nature. 
Here, plaintiff has not argued that TurMexico was the servant 
of Morris. Indeed, plaintiff has specifically asserted, among 
other things, that Morris and TurMexico may have functioned as 
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joint venturers. See App. Br., p. 12, citing Score v. Wilson, 611 
P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1980); Strand v. Cranney, 607 P.2d 295, 296 
(Utah 1980). When two companies associate in a joint venture, each 
is liable for the negligent acts of the other — yet, neither pays 
the other a wage or tells it whom to hire and fire. Further, a 
general contractor may be held vicariously liable for the negli-
gence of a subcontractor's employee. See Pate v. Marathon Steel 
Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989). Although a general contractor does 
exercise some control over subcontractors, it does not exercise the 
authority to hire and fire employees. In this regard, Morris1 
relationship with the employee of TurMexico, who caused the harm, 
is wholly irrelevant. No one is alleging that the bus driver was 
a servant or employee of Morris — he was an employee of Morris1 
agent. 
Additionally, in both Foster and Glover, the defendant offered 
evidence in support of summary judgment, which specifically 
detailed the nature of their respective relationships with the 
alleged agents. Here, Morris has offered no such evidence. 
Instead, it relies upon a lack of evidence and upon its own self-
serving, conclusory statements. In Foster, the defendant produced 
a contract spelling-out the nature of the relationship in question, 
and establishing that no agency existed. Here, Morris seeks to 
rely upon the lack of a written contract with TurMexico. That can 
be hardly accorded similar weight. Moreover, instead of explaining 
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the nature of its relationship with TurMexico, Morris is noticeably 
vague and reliant upon conclusory characterizations. 
Such evidence might be sufficient to sustain a motion for 
summary judgment, but only if allowed to go unopposed. Here, 
plaintiff offered evidence that TurMexico actually acted on behalf 
of Morris with regard to welcoming travelers and coordinating their 
activities. Indeed, TurMexico even provided information about 
services provided by others, such as the hotel (R. 85). Clearly, 
TurMexico did more than simply provide ground transportation. 
Although this evidence might not be sufficient to raise an issue of 
fact as to actual agency in the context of the type of evidence 
offered in Foster or Glover, it is more than sufficient here.5 
3. The Evidence Fails to Show That the Bus Tour, on Which Mr. 
Guevara was Injured, was Separate from TurMexicofs Role as an 
Agent. 
Morris admits that TurMexico served "as a representative of 
Morris Air in Puerto Vallarta," but claims that, much like its own 
role as a principal, TurMexico1s agency was somehow limited. 
According to Morris, TurMexico1s operation of the bus (which 
injured Mr. Guevara) was some how separate from its role as an 
agent. See Resp Br., pp. 13-14. As usual, this assertion is 
noticeably lacking in detail. Morris makes no effort to delineate 
the parameters of these supposedly separate roles, beyond the self-
5Regardless of whether or not there is an issue as to actual 
agency, Morris's oral and written representations create a dispute 
as to the separate issue of apparent agency. 
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serving claim that operating the bus was not part of any agency. 
It offers no evidence or reason in support of that claim. 
The bus tour was expressly part of the vacation package which 
Mr. Guevara purchased from Morris and for which he paid it valuable 
consideration. It was operated by a party which Morris now admits 
had some equivocally-defined role as its representative. It was 
listed as part of his package, along with other items (not 
involving ground transportation) in a letter on TurMexicofs letter-
head, sent to Mr. Guevara months before the trip (R. 84) . By 
contrast, in Glover, the injured scout's Boy Scout membership did 
not include the right to a ride home from the scoutmaster after a 
meeting. In Foster, the injured party had not purchased from 
Texaco the right to help the service station proprietor fix a car. 
Indeed, unlike the case at bar, the plaintiff in Foster had no 
dealings with Texaco, the alleged principal. 
More fundamentally, there is clearly a jury issue on this 
particular point. Morris has, basically, admitted that TurMexico 
was more than just an independent contractor with respect to this 
trip. There is no evidence to support Morris1 attempt to sever the 
bus tour from TurMexico's broader role. In coordinating activities 
on behalf of Morris, TurMexico transported clients to and from 
these activities and conducted tours, including the bus tour, 
during which Mr. Guevara was injured. Having established that 
TurMexico had an agency role of some type, it is for a jury to 
determine its parameters. 
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4. Defendant's Reliance Upon "Travel Agent" Cases is Misplaced. 
Morris attempts to distinguish the cases involving "travel 
agents," which plaintiff has cited, on the ground that the facts in 
those cases are different from the facts here. That may be true, 
but it misses the point. These cases support two key propositions, 
notwithstanding any factual differences. First, they show that a 
defendant is not immune from vicarious liability simply because it 
calls itself "a travel agent." Liability depends upon what the 
defendant has said and done, not upon a label. Second, these cases 
show that summary judgment is improper where, as here, there is 
evidence that the defendant had a broader role than that of "travel 
agent." 
The "travel agent" cases cited by Morris are not to the 
contrary. There was no vicarious liability in those cases because 
there was no evidence, that the so-called "travel agent" did 
anything more than book a trip. The key was a lack of any evidence 
as to a broader or different role. These cases do not, as 
defendant suggests, obviate the need to look at the facts just 
because the defendant is a so-called "travel agent." They do not 
pre-empt the application of standard contract and agency law in 
cases involving travel agents. They do not establish that the 
evidence offered by Mr. Guevara is inherently irrelevant or 
insufficient. They merely show that doing nothing more than 
booking a trip does not subject one to vicarious liability. 
15 
Here, there is specific evidence that Morris had a broader 
role than just booking a trip. The objective facts contradict 
Morris' claim that it was only a travel agent. Summary judgment 
was, therefore, improper. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is correct in one respect — Mr. Guevara's belief 
that TurMexico was an agent of Morris is insufficient by itself to 
preclude summary judgment. However, the issue here is whether or 
not that belief was objectively reasonable in light of the contract 
language and other evidence. Whether analyzed in terms of the 
contract, the circumstances or both, it was not unreasonable for 
Mr. Guevara to understand that TurMexico was an agent or associate 
of Morris. It was not unreasonable for Mr. Guevara to rely upon 
the presence of an authorized representative in Mexico, in deciding 
to purchase this trip. There are facts from which a jury could 
infer a basis for liability. That is all the court below was 
permitted to consider. It was not permitted to "decide" the issue. 
Summary judgment was, therefore, improper, and this case must be 
reversed and remanded for trial. 
DATED this fifij day of ^7^7c^r 1997. 
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